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I. Introduction
On August 22, 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), which radically altered the structure of the welfare 
system in the United States. Among other things, the act replaced 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
a federal entitlement, with the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) program, a system of block grants to states.
One of the primary goals of TANF is to move welfare 
recipients into work and economic self-sufficiency. Although 
states were given much flexibility in how to achieve this goal, the 
federal government imposed some guidelines in the form of 
requirements that welfare recipients be participating in a work-
related activity (“work participation requirements”) and time 
limits on length of welfare receipt. The focus of this paper is on 
alternative financial incentive schemes that are being used or 
could be used to help states meet the work participation 
requirements specified by the federal legislation. In particular, 
the paper considers whether an earnings supplement 
conditioned on full-time work would encourage more people to 
work than the enhanced earnings disregards currently being 
used or tested by many states.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II provides a background of the PRWORA 
legislation and describes methods that states have been 
using to encourage employment and economic self-
sufficiency among the welfare population. The discussion 
focuses on various financial incentive schemes adopted by 
the states. Section III describes a financial incentive scheme 
currently not being used in the United States (but being 
used on an experimental basis in Canada) that conditions 
benefits on full-time employment. Section IV discusses how 
such a scheme might be implemented in the United States. 
Section V presents estimated effects of such a scheme based 
on results from a microsimulation model. Finally, Section 
VI summarizes the results and offers some concluding 
observations.
II. Background
The federal PRWORA legislation stipulated that 25 percent 
of the caseload in a particular state had to be participating in 
work activities by fiscal year 1997.1 The minimum work 
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participation requirement has been and will be increasing by 
5 percent each year until fiscal year 2002, when it will reach 
50 percent. States failing to meet the work participation 
requirements might not receive the full value of the federal 
TANF block grant. Since 1997, continued economic prosperity 
and substantial declines in welfare caseloads have left states 
with substantial TANF surpluses, and no state thus far has 
failed to meet the work participation requirements (U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2000, pp. 41-3).2
The federal legislation defines an “allowable work activity” 
as unsubsidized employment, subsidized private sector or 
public sector employment, on-the-job training, job-search 
assistance for up to six weeks, community service programs, 
vocational education training for up to one year, and 
education for persons who have not yet completed high 
school. The legislation emphasizes work activities and places 
caps on the number of people who can be placed in 
educational activities. Reducing the caseload can also count 
toward the participation requirement.
States have considerable latitude in penalizing household 
heads who fail to comply with the work activity 
requirements. Benefits can be reduced or terminated, at 
state discretion. States can exempt certain people from the 
requirements, such as single parents of young children, but 
they must meet federal requirements for the percentage of 
their caseload participating in work activities.
The work requirement provisions of PRWORA make it 
crucial for states to find effective ways of moving welfare 
recipients into work. Many studies have shown that a 
significant portion of the caseload spends more than sixty 
months receiving benefits (the maximum time limit 
specified under PRWORA, although many states have opted 
for shorter time limits). Bane and Ellwood (1994), for 
example, estimate that the median length of total welfare 
receipt (not necessarily a continuous spell) is about forty-
eight months. Pavetti (1995) estimates that 76 percent of the 
welfare caseload at any point in time (which is dominated by 
long-term recipients) will eventually receive welfare for at 
least sixty months. She finds that among those who received 
welfare for sixty months or more, 63 percent lacked a high school 
diploma (or GED) at the time they started collecting welfare, 
39 percent had no work experience, 53 percent were under 
twenty-five years of age, 58 percent had never been married, 
and 52 percent had a child under the age of one year. Clearly, 
in the absence of effective actions by the states, many 
individuals are likely to be in financial despair when the 
time limit is reached.
The wide latitude given to states in implementing the 
1996 legislation has led to many innovative welfare-to-work 
programs throughout the country. To stimulate work by 
household heads, states have designed programs that 
provide both services and financial incentives (see, for 
example, U.S. General Accounting Office [1998]). Until 
now, most of the emphasis has been on services, particularly 
those, such as job-search assistance, aimed at preparing 
welfare recipients for immediate employment. Less 
attention has been paid to financial incentives, although 
most states have modified their benefit formulas to provide 
financial incentives to work. Prior to 1996 (and since 1982), 
a working welfare recipient lost one dollar of cash assistance 
for each dollar of earnings (after four months of earnings). 
That is, benefits were reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis 
with earnings. Such a high “tax rate” provided a powerful 
disincentive to work. Beginning in the early 1990s, some states 
were granted waivers to the AFDC program rules, and several 
of these states introduced enhanced disregards that excluded a 
certain amount of earnings when calculating welfare benefits. 
Since PRWORA, establishment of enhanced disregards 
accelerated. According to Gallagher et al. (1998), between 
January 1992 and October 1997, forty-one states had adopted 
some form of enhanced disregard. Eleven of these states had 
established their enhanced disregard prior to August 1996. 
Since 1997, an additional six states have adopted enhanced 
disregards (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
2000, pp. 201-3).3
 Table 1 shows the earnings disregards being used by 
states under TANF as of January 2000. The disregards have 
two components: a flat component and a variable 
component. The flat component is a fixed dollar amount of 
exempt earnings. The variable component is a percentage of 
earnings above the flat disregard (either fixed or varying 
with the level of earnings, time spent on welfare, or caseload 
status). Prior to TANF (from 1981 to 1996), the AFDC 
program had a flat disregard of $120 for the first twelve 
months of earnings and $90 thereafter. The variable 
disregard was one-third of earnings above $120 for the first 
four months of earnings and zero thereafter, thus creating a 
“tax” (or “benefit reduction”) rate of 100 percent on 
earnings.4 After TANF, many states adopted very liberal (or 
enhanced) disregards. For example, Connecticut currently 
disregards all earnings up to the poverty level until families 
encounter the state welfare program’s time limit, so that the 
effective benefit reduction rate is zero for all families with 
income below the poverty level. Other states, such as 
Nevada, disregard all earnings initially, but then phase in 
decreasing disregards over time. A substantial number of the 
states disregard between 20 and 50 percent of earnings and 
have a flat disregard of between $100 and $200 per month.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 107
Table 1
Earnings-Disregard Policies for TANF Recipients
January 2000
State Flat Disregarda Variable Disregardb
Alabama 0 100% for first three months, 20% thereafter




Colorado Same as pre-TANFd Same as pre-TANFe
Connecticut 0 100% (up to poverty level)
Delaware Same as pre-TANFd Same as pre-TANFe
District of Columbia $100 50%
Florida $200 50%




Indiana Same as pre-TANFd Same as pre-TANFe
Iowag 0 60%
Kansas $90 40%
Kentucky Zero for first two months, same as pre-TANF after two monthsd 100% for first two months, same as pre-TANF thereaftere






Mississippi Zero for first six months if employed full-time within one
month after first benefit or start of formal job-search activity,
$90 thereafter, $90 otherwise
100% for first six months if employed full-time within one 
month after first benefit or start of formal job-search activity
Missouri $90 67% for first twelve months, zero thereafter
Montana $200 for first twenty-four months, $100 thereafter 25% for first twenty-four months, zero thereafter
Nebraska 0 20%
Nevada Zero for first twelve months,
$90 thereafter if monthly earnings less than $450
100% for first three months, 50% for next nine months,
20% thereafter if monthly earnings exceed $450
New Hampshire 0 50%
New Jersey 0 100% for first month, 50% thereafter 
New Mexico $150 50%
New York $90 46%
North Carolina 0 100% for first three months, 27.5% thereafter
North Dakota $182 for first eight months, $145 for next two months,
$108 for next two months if monthly earnings less than $333.33, zero if 
earnings exceed $333.33
Zero if monthly earnings less than $333.33, 27% thereafter
Source: Adapted by authors from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2000, pp. 201-3).
Note: TANF is the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program.
aThe flat disregard is the initial amount of earnings that is disregarded when calculating benefits.
bThe variable disregard is the percentage of earnings above the flat disregard that is disregarded when calculating benefits.
cDisregard stipulated as 20 percent and 60 percent of remainder.
dPre-TANF flat disregard is $120 for first twelve months, $90 thereafter.
ePre-TANF variable disregard is one-third for first four months of earnings, zero thereafter.
fDisregard stipulated as 20 percent, then $200, then 36 percent of remainder.
gDisregard stipulated as 20 percent and 50 percent of remainder.
hDisregards are the same as pre-TANF for families not subject to time limits.  If earnings exceed poverty level, families are not eligible for benefits.
iFormally, the variable disregard operates as “fill-the-gap budgeting,” rather than as an earned income disregard.
jWisconsin has no benefit formula.  Benefits are zero for families with earnings.108 Using Financial Incentives
During the period in which states were incorporating 
financial incentives into their welfare benefit formulas, 
work effort among welfare recipients increased 
dramatically. From 1993 to 1997, employment among single 
mothers on welfare rose by 14 percentage points. According 
to Blank, Card, and Robins (2000), welfare mothers 
accounted for close to one-half of the rise in work by all 
single mothers over this period. As the authors explain, 
these rises are especially notable in view of the rapid decline 
in welfare use over the same period, which might have been 
expected to shift the pool of remaining welfare participants 
toward a more disadvantaged and less work-ready 
population. Even with this potential selection effect, 
however, work effort among welfare recipients rose.
Of course, the work effort of welfare recipients was 
probably affected by other changes that occurred during this 
period. One important change was a substantial expansion 
of the earned income tax credit (EITC). Blank, Card, and 
Robins show that while some of the rise in employment 
among welfare recipients is undoubtedly due to the 
expansion of the EITC, some of it is also probably due to the 
adoption of enhanced welfare disregards. A randomized 
experiment in Minnesota also shows that enhanced 
disregards encourage work (Miller et al. 2000).
Despite substantial increases in work effort among 
welfare recipients in recent years, most recipients remain 
out of work or are working too few hours to be economically 
self-sufficient. In a study of welfare leavers in Michigan, 
Danziger (2000) finds that one reason why poverty has not 
declined as fast as welfare caseloads is that few former 
recipients are working full-time, full-year.5 Given the 
existence of time limits, it is crucial that recipients become 
employed full-time before exiting welfare.6
III. Encouraging Full-Time Work 
by Welfare Recipients: 
The SSP Program
Few of the enhanced disregards being used by states are 
structured to encourage full-time work. The same may also be 
said for the EITC. The reason is that the financial rewards from 
working can be achieved at low levels of work effort as well as 
at high levels. For example, in 1999, the EITC for a family with 
two children increased with earnings at the rate of about 
40 percent up to earnings of $9,500 per year and was constant 
between earnings of $9,500 and $12,500. For incomes above 
$12,500, the subsidy was phased out at the rate of about 
21 percent, or until earnings reached $30,850. Thus, a person 
receiving a wage of $6 per hour would have received the 
maximum EITC subsidy of $3,816 (more than $300 per month) 
by working full-time (for example, forty hours per week). 
However, a substantial subsidy could also have been received 
Table 1
Earnings-Disregard Policies for TANF Recipients (continued)
January 2000 





Rhode Island $170 50%
South Carolina Zero for first four months, $100 thereafter 50% for first four months, zero thereafter
South Dakota $90 20%
Tennessee $150 0
Texas $120 90% for first four months, zero thereafter
Utah $100 50%
Vermont $150 25%
Virginiah 0 Zero for income below poverty level, 100% otherwisei
Washington 0 50%
West Virginia 0% Varies, averages 40%
Wisconsinj ——
Wyoming $200 per spouse 0FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 109
for part-time work, and the full subsidy can be received at part-
time work if the person is earning much more than $6 per hour. 
Similarly, welfare recipients in most states can benefit from 
enhanced disregards at less than full-time work as well as at 
full-time work.
The fact that full-time work is relatively infrequent among 
welfare recipients suggests a possible need for restructuring 
financial incentives to encourage more full-time work. A social 
experiment being conducted in the Canadian provinces of 
British Columbia and New Brunswick is testing a financial 
incentive program that rewards welfare recipients only if they 
work full-time.7 The program is called the Self-Sufficiency 
Project, or SSP. Under SSP, which began in late 1992, long-
term, single-parent welfare recipients (those receiving benefits 
for at least a year)8 who take a full-time job within one year are 
eligible to receive an earnings supplement for up to three 
years.9 The SSP supplement is quite generous: in certain cases, 
it can double a person’s earnings. For example, in New 
Brunswick, someone earning $10,000 per year (say, working 
forty hours per week for fifty weeks at $5 per hour) would 
receive supplementary payments totaling $10,000 per year.10 
As long as the recipient continues to work full-time, the 
supplement can be received for up to three years.11
The SSP supplement bears some resemblance to the negative 
income tax (NIT), which was proposed as an alternative to 
welfare more than thirty years ago. There are three main 
differences between SSP and the NIT, however. First, SSP only 
pays benefits if the recipient works full-time. Second, it is 
targeted to welfare recipients, whereas the NIT was envisioned as 
a universal program. Third, SSP is available only for a limited 
period (three years), whereas the NIT did not have a time limit. 
Because of these differences, SSP strongly encourages work, 
whereas the NIT was found to discourage work.
SSP has been remarkably successful during its early years of 
implementation. In the fifth quarter after the program began, 
full-time employment of the program group was more than 
double the full-time employment of the control group, 
29 versus 14 percent (see Card and Robins [1998] and 
Michalopoulos et al. [2000]). SSP achieved this effect primarily 
by moving people from nonemployment to full-time employ-
ment, but a significant number of people also switched from 
part-time to full-time employment. Although SSP increased 
government transfer payments by about $55 per month (net 
of taxes), each $1 the government spent on additional transfer 
payments brought more than $2 of increased earnings and led 
to more than $3 of additional income for program group 
members. By way of contrast, the NIT generated less than $1 
of additional earnings for each $1 of additional government 
transfer payments (Keeley et al. 1978). SSP also reduced 
poverty (the fraction of the program group having family 
incomes below the low-income threshold) by 12 percentage 
points and increased spending on food, clothing, and shelter.12
The early success of SSP in Canada raises the intriguing 
question of whether such a program would generate similar 
effects in the United States. Although the welfare systems in 
Canada and the United States are similar, differences make it 
difficult to draw comparisons. This has been especially true 
since PRWORA was enacted. As we indicated earlier, the U.S. 
system now imposes a time limit on welfare receipt, and there 
is a strong emphasis on placing recipients in work activities 
before the time limit is reached. The Canadian welfare system 
currently does not have time limits, although there is an 
emphasis on promoting economic self-sufficiency through 
work, as evidenced by the Canadian government’s willingness 
to test SSP on a pilot basis.
In designing SSP, researchers at Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation used a microsimulation model to predict 
the impacts of alternative program models. As described in 
Greenberg et al. (1995) and Michalopoulos (1999), the model 
performed extremely well in predicting the eventual effects of the 
SSP program tested. Given its proven accurate predictive ability, 
we use the model in this paper to estimate the effects of an SSP-
type financial incentive program in the United States.13
IV. Implementing SSP
in the United States
Because welfare reform efforts are already under way in the 
United States and because the EITC has been expanded 
significantly since 1994, the effects of an SSP financial incentive 
superimposed on the old AFDC system are not of particular 
policy relevance. Instead, it is of interest to examine what 
would have happened if states had coupled the nonfinancial 
components of their welfare-to-work programs with an SSP-
type earnings supplement instead of with enhanced earnings 
disregards.14 
To answer this question, we use data from three welfare-to-
work programs currently operating in the United States that 
are similar to TANF programs and are being evaluated using an 
experimental design. They are the Portland (Oregon) Job 
Opportunities and Basic Skills Training (PJOBS) Program 
being evaluated as part of the National Evaluation for Welfare-
to-Work Strategies, the Florida Family Transition Program 
(FTP), and the Minnesota Family Investment Program 
(MFIP). The features of these three welfare-to-work programs 
are described in Table 2.110 Using Financial Incentives
Each program in Table 2 is similar to the TANF programs 
currently operating at the state level. In the table, a distinction 
is made between the financial incentive features of the 
programs and their other features. As the table indicates, over 
the study periods, two of the three programs (MFIP and FTP) 
had enhanced disregards. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 1, 
Oregon subsequently introduced a 50 percent variable 
disregard into its TANF program. All three programs use 
intensive case management and mandatory employment-
focused services, as outlined in the TANF legislation. Florida 
has instituted a shorter intermediate time limit (twenty-four or 
thirty-six months, depending on how job-ready a recipient is) 
than is required by the federal legislation. Minnesota has 
cashed out the food stamp program, and has turned food 
stamps, general assistance, and AFDC into one welfare 
program. Having one welfare program makes MFIP more 
similar to the Canadian Income Assistance program.
Follow-up survey data are available on program and control 
group members for each of these three programs. For PJOBS 
and FTP, the data are available for two years; for MFIP, they are 
available for three years. The microsimulation analysis uses 
follow-up data from the second follow-up year for all three 
Table 2
Features of the Welfare-to-Work Programs in Three States
Program/
Study Period Financial Incentives Other Features Employment Characteristics of Enrolled Families
Minnesota (MFIP)/
  1994 to 1995
1. Benefits increased by 20% for
     workers and reduced by 62%
     with earnings
1. Mandatory employment-focused activities 1. 52% of long-term recipient full MFIP program
     group in urban counties employed in quarter
     seven (N=676)
2. Benefits may not exceed
     benefits for nonworkers
2. Direct child-care payments to providers 2. 42% of long-term recipient MFIP financial
     incentives only program group in urban
     counties employed in quarter seven (N=681)
3. Food stamps cash-out 3. 38% of long-term recipient control group in
     urban counties employed in quarter seven
     (N=687)
Florida (FTP)/
  1994 to mid-1998
1. Disregard of $200 plus one-half
     of remaining earnings
1. Twenty-four-month time limit on benefits 1. 53% of program group employed in last
     quarter of year two (N=1,405)
2. Intensive case management 2. 45% of control group employed in last quarter
     of year two (N=1,410)
3. Enhanced employment and training services
4. Parental responsibility mandates
Oregon (PJOBS)/
  1993 to mid-1996
1. Disregard of $30 plus one-third
    of remaining earnings for first
    four months, no disregard after
    four months (pre-TANF rules)
1. Mandatory employment-focused activities
    that were strictly enforced
1. 46% of program group employed in last
    quarter of year two (N=3,529)
2. Integrated case management 2. 35% of control group employed in last
    quarter of year two (N=2,018)
3. Employment-focused
Sources: Miller et al. (2000); Bloom et al. (2000); Scrivener et al. (1998).
Note: MFIP is the Minnesota Family Investment Program; FTP is the Family Transition Program; PJOBS is the Portland (Oregon) Job Opportunities and 
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studies. By this time, members of the program group in each 
of the studies would have had some chance to respond to the 
TANF-like provisions they faced. Furthermore, the second 
follow-up year falls between 1995 and 1997 for all three studies; 
therefore, members of the program group probably had also 
responded to the expanded EITC. Using the survey data from 
each program and the microsimulation model, it is possible to 
estimate what additional effects, if any, an SSP-type program 
would have. In the case of Oregon and Minnesota, it is also 
possible to estimate how the SSP financial incentive would 
compare with the enhanced disregards adopted by those states 
in response to TANF. The post-TANF enhanced disregard 
currently in existence in Florida is identical to the financial 
incentive used in the FTP study.
If adopted in the United States, an SSP program could be 
operated as a separate program, as it is in Canada. Berlin (2000) 
suggests that if a separate program was not created, and SSP 
operated as part of the existing welfare system, it might make 
sense for the TANF time-limit clock to stop ticking for people 
working full-time. Thus, the time spent working full-time 
would not count against the sixty-month (or less) TANF time 
limit. Of course, an SSP program could also have a time limit 
(as it does in Canada), which would limit its cost.15 With a time 
limit, the spirit of the TANF legislation would be maintained, 
but in a separate context that uses financial incentives to 
encourage full-time work.
Two SSP financial incentive schemes are examined in this 
paper. All are patterned after the programs being tested in 
British Columbia and New Brunswick. To be included in the 
simulation, a welfare recipient must have been receiving AFDC 
at the end of the two-year follow-up period as well as in eleven 
of the twelve prior months. Once eligible, the welfare recipient 
qualifies for the earnings supplement if a full-time job of thirty 
or more hours per week paying at least the minimum wage is 
taken. In addition, the recipient cannot simultaneously receive 
welfare and the earnings supplement.
The SSP financial incentive operates by paying people who 
meet the full-time work requirement a supplement equal to one-
half the difference between a “target” earnings level and actual 
earnings (see endnote 10 for the exact formula used). For the 
purposes of this paper, we examine the effects of programs using 
two target earnings levels: $20,000 and $30,000.16 For the target 
earnings level of $20,000, if the person works forty hours per week 
for fifty weeks per year and earns $7 per hour (about the average 
wage in our samples), the annual SSP subsidy would be $3,000, or 
roughly one-fifth of annual earnings of $14,000. For the target 
earnings level of $30,000, the SSP subsidy would be $8,000, or 
roughly three-fifths of annual earnings.
Although these subsidy amounts seem substantial, it should 
be kept in mind that the recipient is required to give up AFDC 
(TANF) benefits in order to receive the subsidy. In Oregon, the 
average annual AFDC benefit was close to $6,000 per year, 
which is substantially more than the SSP subsidy under the 
program with the lowest target earnings level ($20,000) and 
about $2,000 less than the SSP subsidy under the program with 
the highest target earnings level ($30,000). Furthermore, 
people who work might also pay federal and state income taxes, 
which further reduce the government costs of the program. 
However, people who work qualify for the EITC and some 
people who would have left AFDC (TANF) without being 
offered the SSP financial incentive will receive subsidies.
The chart shows, for the three sites, the net weekly income 
by weekly work effort for a single mother of two earning $8 per 
hour under SSP programs with a $20,000 and $30,000 target 
earnings level. For reference, net weekly income is also shown 
under the traditional AFDC earnings disregard ($120 per 
month disregarded, taxed at the rate of 100 percent thereafter) 
and the post-TANF earnings disregards adopted by states (a 
50 percent variable disregard in Oregon, the same $200 flat and 
50 percent variable disregards as those used in the experimental 
FTP program in Florida, and a 38 percent variable disregard in 
Minnesota that differed from the disregard used in the 
experimental MFIP program).17
The three panels of the chart illustrate how the 
traditional AFDC earnings disregards provide little 
incentive for welfare recipients to work. As shown in the 
top panel, for example, net weekly income in Oregon is 
relatively constant, between four and eighteen hours of 
work per week for a mother of two who earns $8 per hour. 
This is the range over which earnings have exceeded the 
AFDC flat disregard ($120 per month) and are deducted 
dollar-for-dollar from the AFDC benefit. 
The post-TANF enhanced earnings disregards adopted 
by the states improve the financial incentives to work part-
time, but leave the financial incentives to work full-time 
pretty much unchanged. In contrast, SSP does not provide 
an incentive to work less than thirty hours per week but 
substantially increases the incentive to work thirty or more 
hours. This is especially true of the SSP program simulated 
with a $30,000 target level.
For each of the SSP programs simulated, we report effects 
(or changes) that would occur as a result of the SSP program 
on annual labor force outcomes (full-time and part-time 
employment, hours of work, and earnings), welfare 
outcomes (receipt of AFDC, food stamps, and SSP), and 
various components of net income (AFDC, food stamps, 
EITC, SSP, and income taxes).18 For comparison, estimated 
effects on these outcomes of the TANF earnings disregards 
are also reported. It is important to note that these effects 
are for the chosen sample. Namely, these are effects for people 112 Using Financial Incentives
who were receiving AFDC for almost the entire second year 
of the follow-up period—that is, sample members who 
would be eligible for the SSP supplement at the end of the 
second year of follow-up according to how the program 
operates in Canada. In general, the effects of changes in 
TANF earnings disregards for the full welfare population 
will differ from their effects for the simulation samples 
because the full welfare population includes people who 
received welfare for shorter periods of time.
The characteristics of the three welfare-to-work samples 
are presented in Table 3. The first three columns show the 
average characteristics of all people who were randomly 
assigned to the program group in each site. The latter three 
columns show the characteristics of the samples used in the 
simulations. The simulation samples have fewer people than 
the program groups because they were limited to people 
who were receiving AFDC at the end of the second year of 
follow-up and had been receiving AFDC for eleven of the 
twelve months prior to the end of the second year. This 
sample has real-world relevance because an SSP-type 
financial incentive offered in the United States would most 
likely be offered only to those people still receiving TANF 
benefits at the time the SSP program would be introduced.
Almost all families in the program groups are headed by 
never-married women. In Oregon, about two-fifths were 
never married at the beginning of the follow-up period; in 
Florida, three fifths were never married; in Minnesota, 
about two-thirds were never married. The average mother 
was about thirty years old and more than two-thirds had 
children less than six years of age. In Oregon, about one-
quarter were black; in Florida, more than half were black; and 
in Minnesota, about two-fifths were black. Roughly one-third 
of the sample lacked a high-school diploma or a GED and 
roughly one-third of the sample received AFDC as a child. At 
the start of the follow-up period, just over 10 percent of the 
samples worked, with only a small fraction working full-time.
In the year prior to the start of the welfare-to-work 
program, between one-fourth and two-fifths of the mothers 
were employed. Thus, many of these mothers had some sort 
of work experience. In Oregon and Florida, about half of the 
program group received AFDC or food stamps the full year, 
while in Minnesota more than three-quarters received 
AFDC or food stamps the full year. The Minnesota sample is 
somewhat more disadvantaged than the Oregon and Florida 
samples because it includes only long-term recipients from 
urban counties. These are sample members who had been 
on AFDC for at least twenty-four of the thirty-six months 
prior to random assignment, and it is the group that was 
most affected by the Minnesota program (Miller et al. 2000).
Each of the experimental welfare-to-work programs 
significantly increased employment (Bloom et al. 2000; Miller 
et al. 2000; Scrivener et al. 1998).19 Table 4 shows selected 











Budget Constraints under Alternative Financial
Incentive Schemes: Single Mother with Two
Children and Wage Rate of $8 per Hour























50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Minnesota
Source: Robins, Michalopoulos, and Pan (2000).
Note: SSP is the Self-Sufficiency Project (a Canadian program); TANF
is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; AFDC is Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children.
Hours per weekFRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 113
Table 3
Characteristics of Program Group Members in Three Welfare-to-Work Programs
All Program Group Members
















Percentage female 94.9 99.0 99.7 98.7 100.0 100.0
Percentage married, living with spouse 2.7 0.7 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.0
Percentage never married 42.7 57.9 69.9 53.2 69.2 68.9
Age 31.6 28.9 29.0 32.6 29.3 29.8
Percentage with child under age six 65.1 70.8 72.4 70.1 74.6 70.4
Percentage black 27.4 56.2 39.2 38.2 73.8 44.6
Percentage white 62.7 42.4 47.8 55.3 26.2 42.7
Highest grade completed 11.2 11.1 11.5 11.0 11.0 11.5
Percentage with high-school diploma or GED 67.2 57.9 65.8 55.8 49.2 65.3
Percentage receiving AFDC as a child 24.7 19.8 37.9 31.3 31.7 39.9
More than five years 13.9 13.9 25.1 14.9 21.7 27.8
Less than five years 10.9 6.0 12.8 16.4 10.0 12.1
Percentage employed 12.9 11.7 11.1 6.5 10.8 9.2
Full-time (more than thirty hours per week) 1.7 4.8 3.5 1.3 6.2 2.8
Part-time (less than thirty hours per week) 11.2 6.9 7.6 5.2 4.6 6.4
Characteristic in year prior to baseline
Percentage employed 39.9 42.1 30.1 23.4 27.7 27.8
Months receiving AFDC 8.0 8.1 10.6 9.6 10.3 10.7
Months receiving food stamps 8.5 9.2 10.4 10.0 11.1 10.5
Months receiving either AFDC or food stamps 9.1 9.4 10.6 10.4 11.2 10.7
Percentage receiving AFDC in every month 45.1 48.8 75.5 66.2 71.2 79.0
Percentage receiving food stamps in every month 53.5 60.9 72.0 75.3 78.8 75.8
Percentage receiving either AFDC or food stamps 
      in every month
58.2 65.2 75.5 80.5 86.4 79.0
Characteristic during follow-up period
Percentage employed 65.3 75.6 66.1 26.0 48.5 61.6
Full-time (more than thirty hours per week) 17.5 21.4 11.0 0.0 3.0 2.7
Part-time (less than thirty hours per week) 47.8 54.2 55.1 26.0 45.5 58.9
Total hours worked 652 818 607 51 252 442
Earnings $4,882 $4,740 $4,714 $295 $1,135 $3,015
Average hourly wage $7.41 $6.49 $7.57 $6.54 $4.45 $6.98
Sample size 297 299 372 77 66 219
Source: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation calculations using baseline information forms and two-year client survey data from the Portland 
(Oregon) Job Opportunities and Basic Skills Training Program evaluation, two-year client survey data from the Florida Family Transition Program 
evaluation, thirty-six-month client survey data from the Minnesota Family Investment Program evaluation, and unemployment insurance earnings records 
and public assistance benefit records data from Oregon, Florida, and Minnesota.
Note: The simulation samples include program group members who were not living with a spouse or partner at the time of the follow-up interview and who 
received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the twenty-fourth follow-up month and in at least eleven of the twelve months prior to that.114 Using Financial Incentives
between outcomes for program and control group families. 
Because the welfare-to-work programs had already successfully 
increased employment, adding the SSP financial incentive may 
generate smaller increases in employment than if the SSP 
program was superimposed on the old AFDC system. A similar 
argument can be made for the EITC. In Canada, SSP was 
introduced in an environment without an EITC-type program. 
Hence, some of SSP’s effects in Canada may have already 
occurred for the types of welfare recipients who responded to 
the EITC in the United States. When interpreting the effects of 
the SSP program in the United States, therefore, one should 
keep in mind that many of the people who would have 
responded to SSP by finding full-time employment may 
already have responded to either the EITC or the welfare-to-
work program.
Columns 4-6 of Table 3 indicate that the simulation samples 
(those who were on AFDC at the end of the second year of 
follow-up and were on AFDC for at least eleven of the twelve 
prior months) are somewhat more disadvantaged than the full 
program groups. They are less likely to have a high-school 
diploma (although not by very much in Minnesota), they are 
less likely to have worked in the year prior to random 
assignment, they are much less likely to have worked during 
the follow-up period, and their average wages are lower.
V. Simulation Results
Estimated Effects of the TANF Earnings 
Disregards and SSP
Table 5 reports the simulated outcomes under the AFDC 
disregard in the three samples.20 These outcomes include effects of 
all features of the experimental welfare-to-work programs except 
for the enhanced disregards. About one-fifth of the Oregon 
sample is employed and about one-half of the Florida and 
Minnesota samples are employed. Most of the employment is 
part-time, with few sample members employed full-time. This, of 
course, partly reflects the fact that for many welfare recipients full-
time employment would make them ineligible for benefits.
Table 6 reports estimated effects of the TANF earnings 
disregards and the two SSP programs for each of the three 
samples. The first column for each sample (columns 1, 4, and 7) 
shows the estimated effect of the TANF earnings disregard 
used in the state. Each effect is measured relative to the pre-
TANF AFDC flat earnings disregard of $120. The next two 
columns for each sample (columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9) show 
the estimated effects of the two SSP-type financial incentive 
programs.
In Oregon, column 1 illustrates strikingly how variable 
earnings disregards currently being used by many states may be 
quite successful in moving welfare recipients to work, yet at the 
same time might not succeed in moving recipients to economic 
self-sufficiency. The TANF earnings disregard currently used in 
Oregon is estimated to have increased employment 
considerably among long-term recipients (recall that the 
simulation selects program group members in the study who 
were still on AFDC in the last month of the second year of 
Table 4
Effects on Employment and Earnings in the Oregon, 









Quarter 4 7.1*** 4.5*** 11.7***
Quarter 5 9.0*** 4.3** 15.0***
Quarter 6 11.1*** 5.9*** 17.4***
Earnings
Quarter 4 $191*** $90** $150**
Quarter 5 $201*** $104** $235***
Quarter 6 $267*** $150*** $264***
Sample sizea 5,547 2,815 1,363
Sources: The Oregon data are from Scrivener et al. (1998); the Florida data 
are from Bloom et al. (2000); the Minnesota data are from Miller et al. 
(2000).
Notes: The Minnesota data are for long-term recipients in urban counties. 
The Minnesota study defined long-time receipt as two years or more in 
the prior three years. Random assignment dates were: Oregon, February 
1993-December 1994; Florida, May 1994-October 1996; Minnesota, 
April-December 1994.
     Following the Oregon and Minnesota studies, Quarter 1 is defined as 
the calendar quarter in which random assignment falls. In the Florida 
study, Quarter 1 was defined as the quarter after the calendar quarter in 
which random assignment fell. Quarter 4 in the table therefore corre-
sponds to Quarter 3 in Bloom et al. (2000).
     Effects are measured as differences between outcomes for program and 
control groups. A two-tailed t-test was used to assess the statistical signifi-
ance of differences between outcomes for program and control group mem-
bers. Rounding may cause slight discrepancies in sums and differences.
aSample sizes differ from those in Table 2. Sample sizes include program 
and control group members who responded or did not respond to the
follow-up survey.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 115
follow-up and in at least eleven of twelve prior months). 
The 50 percent earnings disregard is estimated to have 
increased employment by just over 23 percentage points. All 
of this employment, however, is part-time.
Comparing columns 2 and 3 with column 1 provides an 
estimate of what would have happened if Oregon had 
instituted an SSP-type financial incentive instead of a 
50 percent earnings disregard. Unlike the 50 percent earnings 
disregard, the SSP-type financial incentive programs increase 
full-time employment. Furthermore, for both SSP-type 
programs, they do so without any net increase in cash transfers 
from the government. An SSP program with target earnings of 
$20,000 would increase the full-time employment rate by 
5.2 percentage points, annual earnings by $406, and net annual 
income by $261 (column 2). All of this occurs while net cash 
transfer payments from the government to recipients decrease 
by $146. An SSP program with target earnings of $30,000 
would increase the full-time employment rate by 10.4 percent-
age points, annual earnings by $884, and net annual income by 
$946, without significantly increasing the amount of cash 
transfers to recipients by a statistically significant amount 
(column 3).
Despite their sizable effects on full-time employment, the 
SSP-type programs do not generate nearly as much 
employment (either full- or part-time) in Oregon as the TANF 
earnings disregard does. The SSP program with target earnings 
of $30,000 would increase employment by 6.5 percentage 
points and the SSP program with target earnings of $20,000 
would increase employment by only 1.3 percentage points. 
Nonetheless, the SSP-type incentives are estimated to reduce 
AFDC and food stamp payments substantially. Such 
reductions are possible because many of those who are 
estimated to go from part-time to full-time work when offered 
an SSP supplement are people working very few hours and 
receiving practically their full welfare grant amount.
These results imply that an SSP program as generous as the 
ones tested in Canada would modestly increase employment 
and income among this group of persons in the Oregon 
welfare-to-work program at no additional cost to the 
government. Full-time employment would have increased by a 
somewhat greater amount. For the more generous SSP-type 
program, net family income would increase by almost three 
times the estimated increase generated by the TANF earnings 
disregard. It is important to emphasize that these effects are 
those in addition to the effects already generated by the 
expanded EITC. Without the EITC, the effects of SSP and the 
TANF disregard might have been substantially larger.
Thus, in the present welfare environment, if the policy 
objective is to increase full-time employment and income 
without any additional cost to the government, our results 
suggest that a moderately generous SSP program could be 
somewhat more effective than the enhanced disregard actually 
adopted by Oregon under its TANF program.
Simulation results for Florida’s FTP program are presented 
in columns 4-6 of Table 5. Unlike Oregon’s experimental 
welfare-to-work program, the FTP included an enhanced 
disregard ($200 flat and 50 percent variable) as part of its 
program. The enhanced disregard in Florida’s TANF program 
is identical to the enhanced disregard tested in the FTP 
program. The estimated effects of this enhanced disregard for 
the simulation sample are shown in column 4 of Table 5.21 
Columns 5 and 6 show estimated effects of the two SSP-type 
programs.
Table 5
Annual Outcomes under the AFDC Disregard








Employment (percent) 22.1 45.5 51.6
Full-time employment (percent) 0.0 3.0 6.9
Part-time employment (percent) 22.1 42.4 44.8
Hours of work 51 227 379
Earnings (dollars) 299 1,027 2,725
Welfare outcomes (percent)
AFDC receipt 100.0 95.5 99.1
Food stamp receipt 96.1 97.0 NA
SSP receipt 0.0 0.0 0.0
Income outcomes (dollars)
AFDC 5,879 3,715 8,753
Food stamps 3,797 4,447 NA
EITC 97 388 858
SSP 0 0 0
Taxes 23 79 250
  Net government assistancea 9,749 8,471 9,361
  Net incomeb 10,048 9,498 12,085
Source: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation simulation 
model, using data from the Oregon, Florida, and Minnesota welfare-to-
work programs.
Note: AFDC is Aid to Families with Dependent Children; SSP is the Self-
Sufficiency Project (a Canadian program); EITC is the earned income tax 
credit; TANF is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families.
aNet government assistance is TANF + food stamps + EITC + SSP
 - taxes.
bNet income is net government assistance + earnings.116 Using Financial Incentives
Table 6
Simulated Annual Effects of SSP Financial Incentives on Participants in Three Welfare-to-Work Programs 




































Employment (percent) 23.4*** 1.3 6.5** 0.0 0.0 1.5 12.3*** 0.0 0.0
Full-time employment (percent) 0.0 5.2** 10.4*** 0.0 15.2*** 24.2*** -0.9 13.2*** 23.7***
Part-time employment (percent) 23.4*** -3.9* -3.9* 0.0 -15.2*** -22.7*** 13.2*** -13.2*** -23.7***
Hours of work 47*** 66** 144*** 26* 126*** 240*** 87*** 45*** 144***
Earnings (dollars) 331*** 406** 884*** 112 595*** 1,159*** 565*** 295*** 929***
Welfare outcomes (percent)
TANF receipte 0.0 -5.2** -10.4*** 4.6* -13.6*** -22.7*** 0.5 -2.7** -11.0***
Food stamp receipt 0.0 -5.2** -9.1*** 3.0 -12.1*** -24.2*** NA NA NA
SSP receipt 0.0 5.2** 10.4*** 0.0 16.7*** 25.8*** 0.0 17.8*** 28.8***
Income outcomes (dollars)
TANF -31 -260** -536*** 168*** -384*** -736*** 52 -493*** -1,486***
Food stamps -64*** -170** -312*** 33 -549*** -1,051*** e e e
EITC 109*** 69* 79** 57** 242*** 195*** 371*** -25 -227***
SSP 0 277** 1,077*** 0 1,046*** 2,912*** 0 806*** 2,747***
Taxes 25*** 62* 245*** 9 70*** 283*** 14 96*** 443***
Net government assistancef -11 -146** 62 249** 286** 1,037*** 409*** 193*** 591***
Net incomeg 320*** 261** 946*** 361*** 881*** 2,196*** 974*** 488*** 1,520***
Source: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation simulation model, using data from Oregon, Florida,
and Minnesota welfare-to-work programs. 
Note: SSP is the Self-Sufficiency Project (a Canadian program); AFDC is Aid to Families with Dependent Children;
TANF is Temporary Assistance for Needy Families; EITC is the earned income tax credit.
aEffects are changes relative to outcomes under the welfare-to-work program with a flat earnings disregard of $120 per month
and a child support disregard of $50 per month (the pre-TANF disregard). 
bOregon’s TANF program has a 50 percent variable earnings disregard. 
cFlorida’s TANF program has a $200 flat disregard and a 50 percent variable disregard. 
dMinnesota’s TANF program has a 38 percent variable disregard.
eMinnesota’s TANF benefit includes the cash value of food stamps.
fNet government assistance is TANF + food stamps + EITC + SSP - taxes.
gNet income is net government assistance + earnings.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 117
Column 4 shows that the simulation predicts no changes in 
employment from the FTP (TANF) earnings disregard. Hours of 
work are estimated to increase slightly, but the incentive does not 
induce anyone to start working, nor does it induce anyone to 
switch from part-time to full-time work. Furthermore, the FTP 
financial incentive is estimated to increase the welfare caseload. 
The FTP financial incentive does increase annual net income, 
but much of this increase (more than two-thirds) comes from an 
increase in government spending.
Both of the SSP programs would have substantially 
increased full-time employment, according to the simulation 
model. Under the less generous SSP program (target earnings 
of $20,000), full-time employment would have risen by just 
over 15 percentage points. Under the more generous SSP 
program (target earnings of $30,000), full-time employment 
would have risen by just over 24 percentage points. For the less 
generous SSP program, all of the increase in full-time 
employment is estimated to be the result of people switching 
from part-time to full-time work, with no net increase in 
overall employment. For the more generous SSP program, 
nearly all of the increase in full-time employment is estimated 
to be the result of people switching from part-time to full-time 
work, with only a 1.5 percentage point increase in overall 
employment. The SSP programs would have increased annual 
hours of work by between 126 and 240 hours and annual 
earnings by between $595 and $1,159. The less generous SSP 
program would have increased net family income by $881, at a 
net cost to the government of $286. The more generous SSP 
program would have increased net family income by more than 
$2,000 (which represents more than a 20 percent increase), at a 
net cost to the government of just over $1,000.
The less generous SSP program costs about the same as the 
enhanced disregard of the FTP program, although the sources 
of costs are different for the two strategies (the SSP induces 
greater decreases in welfare payments and more taxes, but adds 
EITC costs plus SSP supplementary payment costs). However, 
SSP more than doubles the effect on family income, primarily 
because it induces a substantial amount of full-time 
employment. Overall, then, the main difference between SSP 
and the enhanced disregard in the FTP is the greater full-time 
employment associated with the SSP program. Thus, our 
simulation model predicts that many of the people still in the 
FTP and working part-time because of the EITC and the 
nonfinancial components of the FTP would have been induced 
to work full-time under an SSP program that conditioned 
benefits on full-time employment.
Simulation results for Minnesota’s MFIP program are given 
in columns 7-9 of Table 6. Column 7 presents the estimated 
effects of Minnesota’s earnings disregard under TANF. As 
indicated earlier, Minnesota implemented an enhanced 
disregard that was slightly different from the one used in the 
experimental MFIP programs. The earnings disregard 
currently used in the Minnesota TANF program is a 38 percent 
variable disregard with no flat disregard.
According to column 7, the simulation model predicts that 
the TANF earnings disregard increased part-time employment 
for our sample, but had virtually no effect on full-time 
employment.22 With the TANF financial incentive, overall 
employment is estimated to be 12.3 percentage points higher, 
annual hours of work eighty-seven hours higher, and annual 
earnings $565 higher than if there had been no enhanced 
earnings disregard. The simulation model predicts that the 
TANF enhanced earnings disregard has virtually no effect on 
welfare receipt for our sample. Net government costs are about 
$400 higher and net family income is close to $1,000 higher 
because of the enhanced earnings disregard.
Similar to the Florida sample, the Minnesota simulations 
predict that the SSP programs would not increase employment, 
but would cause a substantial number of people to switch from 
part-time to full-time work (columns 8 and 9). Under the less 
generous SSP program ($20,000 target), full-time employment 
would increase by just over 13 percentage points. Under the 
more generous SSP program ($30,000 target), full-time 
employment would increase by almost 24 percentage points. 
For the less generous SSP program, net government assistance 
would rise by $193 and net family income would increase by 
more than twice that amount. For the more generous SSP 
program, net government cost would increase by $591 per 
person, while annual net family income would again rise by 
more than twice that amount.
Effects of the EITC
It is important to emphasize that all effects reported in this 
paper are in addition to changes already resulting from the 
EITC. To the extent that the EITC caused large employment 
gains, the effects of enhanced earnings disregards or of an SSP-
type financial incentive may be reduced because those who are 
most apt to respond to financial incentives will already be 
working in response to the EITC. 
Table 7 shows the effects on labor force outcomes, welfare 
outcomes, and family income of taking away the EITC from the 
study samples. The table shows that much of the employment 
observed in the study samples was indeed generated by the 
EITC. If there had been no EITC, the employment rate would 
have been 12 percentage points lower in Oregon, 11 percentage 118 Using Financial Incentives
points lower in Florida, and 7 percentage points lower in 
Minnesota. In Oregon, the reduction represents over half of the 
observed employment in the sample. According to the 
simulations, very few persons in the study samples were 
combining welfare and full-time work before the EITC was 
taken away. Thus, taking away the EITC results in mostly a 
reduction in part-time employment. It is important to note 
that these estimated effects of the EITC are conditional on 
receiving welfare benefits. It is quite possible that the EITC has 
induced many persons to work full-time and leave welfare, but 
our simulations do not capture this effect because our samples 
only consist of persons on welfare.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Since the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act in 1996, most states have 
included financial incentives in their overall welfare-to-work 
programs. These financial incentives have taken the form of 
enhanced disregards that allow recipients to keep more of their 
welfare benefits as earnings increase. Prior to PRWORA, under 
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, benefits 
after the first year of earnings were reduced dollar-for-dollar 
with earnings. This meant that recipients faced a 100 percent 
“tax rate” on their earnings, which can impose a significant 
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Employment (percent) 22.1 -11.7*** 45.5 -10.6*** 51.6 -7.3***
Full-time employment (percent) 0.0 0.0 3.0 -1.5 6.9 0.9
Part-time employment (percent) 22.1 -11.7*** 42.4 -9.1** 44.8 -8.2***
Hours of work 51 -19*** 227 -73*** 379 -63***
Earnings (dollars) 299 -97*** 1,027 -349*** 2,725 -346***
Welfare outcomes (percent)
AFDC receipt 100.0 0.0 95.5 3.0 87.2 1.8**
Food stamp receipt 96.1 0.0 97.0 1.5 99.1 -0.9
Income outcomes (dollars)
AFDC 5,879 29* 3,715 165*** 5,290 440***
Food stamps 3,797 15*** 4,447 79 3,463 -44***
EITC 97 -97*** 388 -388*** 858 -858***
Taxes 23 -7*** 79 -27*** 250 -2
Net government assistanceb 9,749 -46** 8,471 -118* 9,361 -460***
Net incomec 10,048 -143*** 9,498 -467*** 12,085 -806***
Source: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation simulation model, using data from the Portland (Oregon) Job Opportunities and Basic Skills
Training (PJOBS) Program, Florida’s Family Transition Program (FTP), and the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP).
Note: EITC is the earned income tax credit; AFDC is Aid to Families with Dependent Children; SSP is the Self-Sufficiency Project
(a Canadian program).
aOutcomes are for an AFDC program with a flat earnings disregard of $120 per month and a child support disregard of $50 per month.
Outcomes for Florida and Minnesota samples are simulated outcomes. See text for details of the simulation.
bNet government assistance is AFDC + food stamps + EITC + SSP - taxes.
cNet income is net government assistance + earnings.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 119
disincentive to work. Given the existence of time limits under 
PRWORA and the importance of moving welfare recipients 
into the workforce, most states have reduced this 100 percent 
tax rate through enhanced disregards. The intent of the 
enhanced disregards is to provide a work incentive and to ease 
the transition from welfare to work.
One of the problems with enhanced disregards is that they 
often provide only an incentive to work part-time. Faced with 
a sudden loss in welfare benefits when the time limit is reached, 
many recipients may find that part-time earnings are not 
enough to allow them to be economically self-sufficient. 
Although these families will still be eligible for the earned 
income tax credit, the tax credit also provides only limited 
incentives to work full-time.
This paper has presented results from a simulation model to 
examine whether an alternative form of financial incentive 
could increase full-time employment among long-term welfare 
recipients. The alternative financial incentive scheme 
considered is based on the Self-Sufficiency Project, an 
experimental program being tested in two provinces in 
Canada. SSP provides a direct incentive to work full-time 
because it conditions benefits on full-time work. The program 
is being evaluated using a random assignment design, and the 
results thus far indicate that it is generating sizable increases in 
full-time employment, at little additional transfer cost to the 
Canadian government. Because the welfare-to-work programs 
under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families in the United 
States are different from the welfare-to-work programs in 
Canada, and because Canada does not have an EITC, it is not 
clear what additional effects an SSP-type program might have 
in the United States. This paper has used microsimulation 
analysis to predict what the effects might be if an SSP-type 
program was adopted in the United States.
Our results indicate that an SSP-type program in the United 
States—in place of the enhanced disregards currently being 
used—could have significantly greater effects on full-time 
employment for long-term welfare recipients at modest 
additional cost to the government. Perhaps the most attractive 
feature of SSP is its ability to achieve gains in family income that 
are as much as three times the increase in government cost. Such 
a high “efficiency ratio” is rarely seen in financial incentive 
programs. Thus, an SSP-type program in the United States may 
be an attractive way to ease the transition from welfare to work 
under a system of time-limited welfare benefits.Endnotes
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1. These are the rates for all families. The legislation stipulates much 
higher rates for two-parent families. In fiscal year 1999, for example, 
the two-parent family participation requirement was 90 percent.
2. Several states have failed to meet the two-parent participation rate 
requirement, however.
3. Enhanced earnings disregards are not a new policy. From 1967 
until 1981, the federal AFDC program provided modest financial 
incentives for welfare recipients to work, in the form of a 33 percent 
earnings disregard. Some of the earnings disregards introduced since 
the early 1990s are similar to the pre-1982 disregard.
4. From 1967 to 1981, the AFDC program had a flat disregard of $30 
and a variable disregard of one-third throughout the duration of a 
welfare spell.
5. Danziger’s research is summarized in Joint Center for Poverty 
Research (2000). 
6. We emphasize the importance of full-time work purely from the 
standpoint of economic self-sufficiency. We realize that full-time 
work among single parents may have drawbacks (such as adversely 
affecting child development) and that a case may be made against 
encouraging full-time work for single parents.
7. The welfare system in Canada is called Income Assistance. Canada 
has no food stamp program, so cash benefits in Canada generally are 
higher than they are in the United States.
8. The restriction to long-term recipients is intended to minimize 
“entry effects” (people applying for welfare in order to receive the 
supplement) and “windfall effects” (benefits accruing to recipients who 
would have left welfare and worked full-time anyway in the absence of 
the earnings supplement). As indicated in Card, Robins, and Lin 
(1998), this provision substantially limited entry and windfall effects.
9. Full-time work under SSP is defined as thirty or more hours 
per week.
10.  Formally, the SSP subsidy is given by .5(E* - E), where E* is 
“target” earnings ($30,000 in New Brunswick and $37,000 in British 
Columbia, both in Canadian dollars, when the SSP began) and E is 
actual earnings. The subsidy is available only to people working thirty 
hours per week or more, and has been adjusted upward slightly for 
inflation since 1992.
11. Because the benefits are targeted to long-term welfare recipients, 
there is some horizontal inequity because similar workers not on 
welfare have lower income. However, horizontal inequities exist for 
any program in which some recipients mix welfare and work. 
12.  A companion experiment, conducted on a group of new 
applicants for welfare in British Columbia, did not lead to any net 
increase in government cash transfer payments and had similar effects 
on employment, income, and poverty (see Michalopoulos, Robins, 
and Card [1999]).
13.  For a detailed discussion of the microsimulation model, see 
Robins, Michalopoulos, and Pan (2000). The model incorporates the 
notion of welfare stigma and utilizes the economic framework 
developed by Moffitt (1983).
14. Perhaps an equally interesting question concerns the effects of an 
SSP-type earnings supplement program in addition to enhanced 
earnings disregards. The effects of such a policy are presented in 
Robins, Michalopoulos, and Pan (2000).
15.  TANF costs would be reduced in the short run as persons shifted 
from TANF to the SSP. Of course, these reduced welfare costs would 
be offset by SSP costs. For the SSP program in Canada, the cost of the 
SSP slightly exceeded the reduced welfare cost for long-term 
recipients, but was about the same as the reduced welfare cost for new 
applicants (net of the additional income taxes resulting from the 
additional full-time work). Part of the additional SSP cost was 
“windfall,” resulting from SSP benefits being paid to persons who 
would have left welfare and worked full-time anyway in the absence of 
the SSP-type financial incentive.
16. Recall that in the actual SSP programs being tested in Canada, the 
target earnings levels (in Canadian dollars) are $37,000 in British 
Columbia and $30,000 in New Brunswick. At an exchange rate of .75 
U.S. dollars per Canadian dollar, these target earnings levels in U.S. 
dollars are $27,750 and $22,500, respectively.
17.  Minnesota’s TANF variable earnings disregard was 36 percent 
until October 1999, when it increased to 38 percent. The simulations 
presented in this paper were performed using the 38 percent disregard.
18. Although the effects are presented as changes in annual outcomes, 
the simulation model is based on weekly decisions concerning these 
outcomes. Hence, it is implicitly assumed that all predicted weekly 
changes occur for each week during the year. Although this is a Endnotes (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 121
reasonable assumption given the nature of the SSP earnings 
supplement offer, a more comprehensive simulation model would 
incorporate decisions on how many weeks to work as well as how 
many hours to work per week. The simulations are based on an 
underlying economic model that assumes welfare recipients choose 
how much to work and whether to receive welfare in order to 
maximize their economic well-being. Receiving welfare is assumed to 
be stigmatizing. The welfare recipient is assumed to weigh the benefits 
of the additional income from SSP with the reduced time in activities 
outside of work (such as child-rearing and leisure-time activities). The 
parameters of the underlying economic model are taken from Moffitt 
(1983) and are updated to the present time. For full details on the 
mechanics of the simulation model and how all outcomes are 
calculated, see Robins, Michalopoulos, and Pan (2000).
19. Changes in employment over time for members of the program 
group do not necessarily represent effects of the welfare-to-work 
program because other changes are also occurring that affect 
employment. For one to measure effects validly, behavior of a 
randomly selected control group must also be tracked and compared 
with the behavior of the program group. Such an “experimental” 
approach to measuring program effects is being used in each of the 
welfare-to-work programs examined in this paper.
20. Because the Oregon experimental program used the AFDC 
disregard, these are actual mean outcomes for the Oregon sample.
21. These results do not represent experimental effects of the financial 
incentive component of Florida’s FTP program. Such a program was 
never tested experimentally. Instead, the numbers represent the 
simulated effects of the FTP’s enhanced earnings disregard for the 
simulation sample of long-term welfare recipients. Furthermore, the 
numbers were derived from taking away the financial incentive from 
the simulation sample. To the extent that the sample of long-term 
recipients would have been different if there had not been a financial 
incentive as part of the FTP program, the effects of offering the 
financial incentive will differ from the effects of taking away the 
financial incentive from people who were long-term recipients when 
the financial incentive was offered.
22.  In results not shown here but reported in Robins, Michalopoulos, 
and Pan (2000), we found that the MFIP experimental earnings 
disregard reduced full-time employment and increased part-time 
employment.References
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